Targeted stigma and school voucher threats under a revised 2002 Florida accountability law have positive impacts on school performance as measured by the test score gains of their students. In contrast, stigma public school choice threats under the U.S. federal accountability law, No Child Left Behind, do not have similar effects in Florida. Estimations rely upon individual-level data and are based upon regression analyses that exploit discontinuities within the accountability regimes. Choice threats embedded within accountability regimes can moderate educational inequalities by boosting achievement at the lowest-performing schools, but policy design is crucial.
composition of those taking the test.
3 To our knowledge, no studies have examined the effects on school performance of the public school choice provisions of No Child Left Behind.
Federal and State Accountability Systems in Florida
No Child Left Behind (NCLB), a U.S. federal law enacted in 2002, currently requires states to test all students in grades 3 through 8 in reading and math, with an additional test to be administered in high school. The average performance of all students-and of various student subgroups above a minimum size-on these tests must be publicly reported for all schools.
Schools that do not make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) toward a state-determined level proficiency for two years in succession are said to be "in need of improvement" and their students are given a choice of another public school within the local school district that is not so designated. 4 In Florida, this provision applies only to schools that receive funding through Title I, the federal government's compensatory education program.
NCLB's accountability provisions, first implemented during the 2003 school year, are an outgrowth of previously established accountability systems in several states. 5 Few of these pioneering state accountability systems have attracted greater interest than Florida's A+ Plan, both for well-known political reasons, and because the original 1999 Florida law served as an important model for NCLB. As revised by the legislature and fully implemented in 2002, Florida's A+ Plan resembles NCLB in that the average test performance of students in grades 3 through 10 must be reported annually for each school. In addition, students at twice-failed schools are given the opportunity to attend another school.
Yet certain features of the A+ Plan, as revised, are considerably more rigorous than NCLB. For one thing, students at schools that fail two out of any four years are given the opportunity to receive a voucher to attend any school, public or private, within the school district or elsewhere. The A+ Plan also distinguishes among five levels of school performance, from 'A'
to 'F,' a more detailed set of categories than the AYP-based dichotomy drawn by NCLB. Finally, while NCLB's school accountability system is based solely on the percentage of students in the 3 The one study with access to individual-level data (Figlio and Rouse, 2004 ) was limited to a subset of districts within the state and only examined the "shock" of the less comprehensive accountability system established in 1999, several years before the implementation of the more sophisticated system introduced in 2002 that is the focus of our investigation. 4 If schools remain in need of improvement for an additional year, families become eligible for supplemental educational services after school, either from the school district or from private or non-profit providers. After four years, the school may be reconstituted. 5 School years are identified by the year in which the student takes the examination, which occurs in the spring of that year.
school who achieve proficiency, the grading system Florida adopted in 2002 assigned as much weight to the percentage of students improving their performance over the previous year. elementary schools were said to be "in need of improvement," often because one or more subgroups within the school was identified as not making adequate progress toward proficiency.
It was these grades assigned to schools under each program that determined the incentives schools faced to improve their performance. Under the A+ Plan, schools that received an 'F' bore both the stigma of being among the 2 percent of all schools in Florida given a failing grade as well as the threat that a repeated 'F' would give students at the school the opportunity to use a voucher to go elsewhere. In addition, 'F' schools were assigned a community assessment team made up of parents, business representatives, educators, and community activists who were to write an intervention plan for the school. Schools that received a 'D' were also stigmatized as being among the lowest performing 10 percent of schools in the state and, like the 'F' schools, were assigned an assessment team. Schools receiving higher grades were not subject to any sanctions.
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The incentives created for schools by NCLB's choice threat appear to be more modest, simply because neither the stigma nor the choice threat was particularly consequential. In 2003, no less than 75 percent of the elementary schools in Florida were designated as needing improvement. If most everyone is sanctioned, the embarrassment is less than if only a few are.
What's more, the specific design of the public-school choice sanction caused it to have little bite.
School districts did not lose students (and the funding attached to them), because all choice was contained within the district. And parental choices were limited to the relatively few schools within the same school district that had made adequate yearly progress. In practice, few students exercised the choice. 
Estimating the Impact of Choice Threats
When estimating the impact of a policy intervention, the ideal comparison is that of a Randomized Field Trial (RFT), which estimates effects after assigning subjects randomly to 6 All schools were awarded $100 per pupil, if they improved their standing by one letter grade. 'A' schools also received this amount simply for retaining their standing. These funds could be spent on teacher bonuses or other non-recurring expenses related to student achievement. 7 Nationwide, it was less than 1 percent of those eligible (Peterson, 2005) . treatment and control groups. Unfortunately, within the education policy world, conditions seldom permit the conduct of an RFT. However, policy researchers have in recent years employed a research design that approximates the RFT ideal by comparing subjects that fall on either side of an artificial borderline created for administrative convenience. Whether or not a subject is treated may be due as much to measurement error as to actual differences between the subjects. If so, then the subjects placed in the control group adjacent to the borderline are comparable to those subject to the treatment. For placement of the subjects on either side of the border to be a random act, the policy innovation should be an external shock that the subjects neither anticipated nor helped to shape. Otherwise, subjects could adjust their behavior in such a way as to have anticipated the policy innovation. Estimated impacts of an accountability provision can therefore be interpreted as the impact on student performance as calculated in standard deviations. To increase precision, all results are based upon combined reading and math test scores obtained simply by averaging each student's standardized scores in the two subjects.
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We also obtained students' test scores on the Stanford Achievement Test, 9 th edition (SAT-9), a national norm-referenced test that is administered at the same time as the FCAT but is not used for accountability purposes. This information allows us to test whether any observed improvements on FCAT performance generalize to other areas of knowledge, or whether perhaps an increased focus on the state's exam system actually serves to lower performance on the more general exam. SAT-9 scores are reported in national percentile rankings. To facilitate comparisons with the results of our FCAT analysis, we also converted these rankings to standardized scores with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
The unique impact of the A+ Plan is best estimated using results from tests taken by students in the spring of 2003 -well before NCLB took effect, and when schools were responding to the shock of the new grading system introduced in the summer of 2002. We estimate the impact of the NCLB choice provisions using results from the following year's test administration, the spring of 2004.
'F'-Grade/Voucher-Threat Impacts under the A+ Plan
To isolate the impact of receiving an 'F' and being placed under the threat of vouchers, we first set aside the seven 'F' schools whose students were already eligible to receive vouchers as a result of the workings of the old accountability system. 9 We also excluded the four 'F' schools that would have received an 'F' in 2002, had the previous level-based grading system remained in place. This left us with 24 schools that fell unexpectedly under the voucher threat simply as a consequence of the introduction of the new accountability system.
To ensure that our results were robust to alternative classification systems, we undertook three sets of comparisons. Each was intended to identify treated and control schools that closely resembled one another yet were large enough to allow for the precise estimation of treatment Comparison I is the most inclusive in that it compares all shocked 'F' schools with a fairly broad group of 'D' schools. But as is shown in Table A1 , the baseline characteristics of the schools in the treated and control groups differ significantly along a number of important dimensions. These differences narrow considerably for Comparisons II and III. Most importantly, no significant differences between treatment and control groups in baseline test scores (those attained in 2001) were observed in Comparisons II and III. This similarity minimizes the problem of "regression to the mean" that often bedevils observational studies. The average baseline test scores of the treated and control groups in Comparison I do differ significantly, however. To adjust for such differences, we control in all estimations for multiple measures of students' academic performance the previous year rather than calculating a single gain score.
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We initially use four models to estimate the impact on student performance in 2003 of being newly identified as an 'F' school under the A+ Plan. Model I provides a baseline estimate that controls only for the student's own test score performance the previous year and his or her demographic characteristics. Model II controls for these characteristics plus the aggregated characteristics of the fourth and fifth grade students tested in the school. Model III controls for all the characteristics in Model II plus two measures of the financial and educational resources available to the school. It also reports results for just those students tested in the same school for two consecutive years. 11 Model IV controls for the same variables as in Model III, but includes all students tested at the school, regardless of whether they had attended that school the preceding year.
Model I is estimated using the following equation:
(1) Model II relies upon a modified version of equation (1), where Z st is a vector of schoollevel aggregate demographic and achievement characteristics:
In Models III and IV, which differ only in the sample of students included, the school-level control vector of control variables Z st is expanded to include per pupil operating costs and pupilteacher ratio. In all models, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level.
In the interpretation of results, we place the greatest emphasis on those from Model IV.
It is the most inclusive both in terms of students for whom estimates are obtained and in the number of controls introduced into the analysis.
Effects of Other Grades under the A+ Plan
10 Specifically, we include a cubic in previous FCAT test performance in math and reading to allow for non-linearity in the relationship between prior and subsequent achievement as well as previous national percentile ranking in SAT-9 math and reading. 11 Some administrators feel that schools should be held accountable for the learning gains of only those students within their sphere of responsibility for at least this length of time, not for new students who may be more difficult to integrate into the rhythm of the school and whose progress may in part reflect the school they attended the previous year. 12 See the note to Table 2 for the full list of individual and school-level control variables in each model.
To estimate the impact of receiving each grade other than 'F' we compared schools that received a new, lower grade to a comparable set of schools that accumulated enough points on the state's grading scale to receive the next higher grade. For these analyses, we first employed the Model IV estimation together with the more inclusive Comparison I approach, as described above. For new-'D' schools, where significant impacts were observed, we also conducted Comparisons II and III as robustness checks. (See Table A2 
Effects of NCLB Sanctions
The AYP provisions of NCLB shocked Florida schools in two distinct ways. Schools receiving Title I funds that did not make AYP were immediately placed under a public-school choice threat. Unless they made AYP the following year, students at those schools would have the opportunity to attend another public school within the district that had made AYP. The remaining schools in Florida who failed to make AYP still received the stigma of being identified as not performing at the expected level; however, students at these schools not receiving Title I funds would not become eligible for public school choice. Effects for both types of schools are estimated with all four models, using the Comparison I approach described above, which succeeds in producing groups with similar prior test scores (See Table A3 .)
Results
As the result of the introduction of the new accountability system, a number of Florida schools newly received 'F' grades, identifying them publicly as low-performing schools and subjecting them to the threat of vouchers for continued poor performance. At these schools, students performed at a higher level in the subsequent year than did students at similar schools not so threatened. The size of the impact was about 4 percent of a standard deviation (see Table   2 ). Consistent across all four model specifications, this result is observed even when controlling for the social composition of the school and school resources, as measured by the pupil-teacher ratio and operating costs per pupil. Results are also consistent across the three comparisons presented in Table 3 (cols. 1, 2, and 3). Indeed, the two tighter comparisons yield slightly larger estimates-5 percent of a standard deviation-than those obtained from Comparison I, suggesting that mean reversion is not an important problem even for the more inclusive analysis.
Impacts of the 'F' grade on African Americans and those eligible for the federal free lunch program were about 6 percent of a standard deviation. The point estimates for whites, Hispanics, and students not eligible for free lunch are smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. However, the estimates are all positive and, due to the relatively small number of such students attending treated 'F' schools or schools in the control group, statistically indistinguishable from the estimates for African Americans (see Table 4 ).
Receiving a 'D' under the A+ Plan has its own impact on student performance, as can be seen in Table 3 (col. 4). Students at schools that received a 'D' also performed roughly 4 percent of a standard deviation better than students at similar schools that received a 'C.' Since only 8 percent of the schools received a 'D', the designation appears to have created a stigma that generated a disproportionately positive school response. The results remain much the same for Comparisons II and III (cols. 5 and 6). Significant impacts of receiving a 'D' were detected for African Americans, whites, and both those eligible and not eligible for free lunch (see Table 4 ). Tables 3 and 4 imply that 'D' schools, the control group with which the 'F' schools are compared, were themselves affected by Florida's accountability system, perhaps by the stigma of having received such a low grade. The effects on student performance of receiving an 'F,' with its accompanying voucher threat, are over and above the impact of that stigma.
Moreover, the results in
The improvements associated with receiving an 'F' or 'D' grade had no clear spill-over effect, either positive or negative, on students' performance of the norm-referenced SAT-9 (see Table 3 ). On the other hand, there is no evidence that concentrated attention on the FCAT examination came at the expense of more generalized learning in these subjects; each of the point estimates of the effect of receiving an 'F' or a 'D' on SAT-9 performance is positively signed.
Receiving a grade of 'A,' B,' or 'C' seems, by itself, to have had little differential impact on subsequent student performance (see Table 5 , cols. 3-5). Schools that received a 'C' did no better than similar schools that received a 'B.' The same was true for schools that received 'B's and 'A's. This finding should not be interpreted as evidence that the Florida A+ Plan was having no impact on the performance of higher performing schools, however. Rather, it shows only that the impact is consistent across schools receiving higher grades. Given that the incentives to improve were essentially the same across these categories, a consistent response is not surprising.
In contrast to the schools with an "F" or a "D" under the A+ Plan, there is no indication that Florida schools designated as not having made AYP made differential improvements on student performance the following year. No program effects were observed among Title I schools subject to the public-school choice threat or among non-Title I schools (see Table 6 ).
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Discussion
Grading systems that target and clearly sanction a relatively small percentage of the school population appear to have a more pronounced differential impact on school performance than those that are less targeted. The Florida A+ Plan, by giving 'D's and 'F's to the lowest 10 percent of all schools, then combining the stigma of the low grade with the threat of vouchers for the lowest 2 percent of all schools, stimulated higher levels of student performance at these schools relative to similarly situated schools not so sanctioned. Notably, the improvements made by 'F' schools came on top of the gains registered by 'D' schools, suggesting that the voucher threat may have an additional impact over and above that of stigma alone. Lacking information on schools that received an 'F' grade but were not threatened by vouchers, however, we cannot test this explanation definitively.
Whether the annual increments in student performance of 4 to 5 percent of a standard deviation observed among 'F' and 'D' schools are large or small depends on the extent to which such improvement persists over time or is merely a one-year response. However, if new 'F' schools continued to outperform expectations for the three year period they remained immediately threat of vouchers, the accumulated gains would quickly become educationally significant. Given the fact that the costs of test-based accountability systems are a fraction of those of many other prominent reform strategies (Hoxby 2004b), the return on investment is likely to be large.
In contrast to the results for the A+ Plan, the Florida schools identified under NCLB as needing improvement did not improve their performance more than schools not so designated.
An accountability system that identifies problems with many schools, while giving few sanctions or incentives to improve, appears unlikely to be of much consequence.
Together, these results suggest that choice threats embedded within accountability regimes can effectively moderate educational inequalities by boosting achievement at the lowest-performing schools, but that careful attention must be paid to the design of the accountability system if they are to have their desired effect. All in all, the Florida A+ Plan seems better tailored to the particulars of that state than NCLB has been thus far.
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